Breaking glass

On June 29, right at the time of the so-called transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, the Israeli daily Haaretz reported that

Kurdish politicians speculate that the power transfer to the interim Iraqi government could launch a series of political account settling, which might lead to violent vendettas.

"The struggle is expected mainly among the Shi'ites, between Ali Sistani's men and Moqtada al-Sader's Mehdi Army, now that Sadr is no longer threatened by coalition troops," says a Kurdish official who says he knew of the decision to transfer power early.

"There will be another struggle between the Sunis and Shi'ites, and a third between the Arabs and Kurds, especially in the Kirkuk city area."

And indeed, the signs of fracture lines within a resistance that previously had been united in its opposition to the presence of US and other "coalition" forces are clear and widening. And let's be clear: The result of such splits will not be "victory" for US policy or for the interim government. Shattered glass has a great many cutting edges.

Now, as I've noted before, I think most Iraqis are at least prepared to give the interim government a chance, and the information coming out of Iraq bears me out. The Iraqi Press Monitor (IPM) for July 8 has a report from al-Mashriq, published daily by the Al-Mashriq Institution for Media and Cultural Investments.

A poll made by the market researches and consumer safety centre of University of Baghdad revealed that 89% of Iraqis are willing to cooperate with the new government to rebuild Iraq. 84% said sovereignty could be achieved through an elected government. 54% agreed on imposing martial law and curfew to control security and stability, while 29% showed their conservatism about the law. The results of the poll, despite the opinion diversity, showed that 88% were with the government, and they would aid the law once it was in Iraqi hands.

(To go to IPM-listed articles, go the the IPM link and then choose the day of the report.)

Indeed, most Iraqis appear willing to accept what they regard as the necessity of the new security law giving Prime Minister Iyad Allawi the authority to impose martial law - albeit a martial law theoretically limited in time and scope and to affected areas. The Toronto Star reported last week that

Iraqis welcomed a sweeping new security law eerily reminiscent of the Saddam-era police state, saying that only by restoring law and order can their new government lay a foundation for the freedom and democracy they hope will follow. ...

Baghdadis yesterday welcomed the announcement as the most dramatic sign yet that their government has a strategy for ending the rash of kidnappings, carjackings, murder, theft and assault that has plagued the capital since the fall of the former regime.

But many stressed that while they welcome the crackdown, they demand it be fair — and temporary.

That last sentiment is reflected in an editorial statement from the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, appearing in its daily al-Adala on July 8, one which, however, also suggests that the Star's word "welcomed" was overstated:

Most Iraqis were reluctant regarding issuance of the National Security Law because the state of emergency will inevitably be negative to a part of their freedom. Besides, we do not wish that such obligatory procedures be used in the new Iraq. However, Iraqis should not be liable to death while terrorists practice sabotage. As this is the case, the government has no choice but the emergency state. We have just one way leading to freedom and stability. If we do not walk it, there will be nothing but murder and ruin.

(Via IPM, July 9.)

In short, we're not crazy about this, but for the moment it appears an unfortunate necessity. That this comes from SCIRI is significant in that SCIRI is the organization most closely associated with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

But the question is, is the desire for stability enough? On July 12, the Christian Science Monitor, reporting on the emerging divisions in the resistance, has this:

"It makes me very uncomfortable to say this, but if the American's weren't around [to attack] we would be fighting among ourselves," says a young native of Fallujah who participated in attacks against US forces last year but has since quit the resistance, saying he's been disillusioned by a disregard for civilians shown by some insurgents.

He was particularly disturbed by the mutilation of the Shiite truck drivers. "We can't be satisfied with this new group - they execute alleged spies in the streets without any evidence at all, sometimes it's just payback for a personal dispute. Those Shia were innocent men."

A deeply religious Muslim himself, he says fighters inside Fallujah are now badly split between people like himself who were opposed to the occupation on nationalist grounds and what he calls "extremist Salafys," the catchall term used for the branch of Islam espoused by Al Qaeda and most in Saudi Arabia.

The Shiite truck drivers he referred to, all members of the same family and working with the family-owned trucking cooperative, were kidnapped in Fallujah on June 5. They were tortured and killed, their bodies mutilated - seemingly with the knowledge of the real power in Fallujah, Sheikh Abdallah al-Janabi, or his deputy, Dhafer Al-Obeidi, the head of the Hadra al-Muhammadiyah mosque, and with the collusion or at least submission of the local police. (In fairness, I should note that they all deny any role in the killlings.) The CSM says

The killings and mutilations of the six truckers (some could only be identified by family members from old scars) have shaken many Iraqis. While some Iraqis had mixed feelings about the similar killing and mutilation of four US security contractors, in April, these latest murders have inflamed the Shiite community here, and alienated others. ...

Sitting in the family home in Sadr City, Adnan [Feisal Muthar] and his morose father, Sheikh Feisal Muthar, urge their visitors to look at pictures that showed the extent of men's torture. They point to were a tattoo that said "Imam Ali" was sliced out of Hamid's arm, saying it was evidence of the sectarian nature of the crime. Shiites revere Ali, a descendant of the prophet Mohammed, while extremist Sunnis attack the practice as polytheistic.

Two of the six were Adnan's brothers, the others were cousins.

It's not only within Sadr City that passions have been "inflamed" by the murders. From al-Ittihad, the daily of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, via IPM for July 5.

Al-Rafidain website and other agencies published a strongly-worded announcement signed by 13 of Sada tribes and 41 other Shia tribes. The announcement condemned mutilation of the dead bodies of six young Shia men, a Lebanese, and Iraqis in separate incidents. The announcement also questioned the release of other people and considered this an act of waging sectarian riot. The announcement threatened to surround Ramadi and Fallujah and to kill their citizens anywhere in Iraq under the justification that this was what rioters wanted. The announcement also called for taking quick procedures regarding the targeting of Shia tribes people and the arrest of criminals for trial.

Which brings us back to the hope of security. Is there any way the interim government can act quickly enough, strongly enough, clearly enough, to satisfy such anger?

Shortly before the US occupation authority was dissolved on June 28, Ambassador Paul Bremer issued arrest warrants for Sheikh Janabi and Obeidi, but no action has been taken by Iraqi authorities.

And there is no reason to think they could even if they chose to. Allawi has made a lot of tough statements, including announcing on Thursday his intention to create a new internal security service in order to "annihilate" insurgent groups. But for the most part it has been and remains just that: talk. Instead,

[o]fficials at the Iraqi Ministry of Interior say they're mulling terms of an amnesty for Iraq's insurgents. "We are having a dialogue with some of the important figures in Fallujah," says Interior Minister Falah Hassan al-Nagib,

a choice not likely to go over well with a good number of Shiites. So how soon before too many Iraqis decide that the government can't or won't act on their behalf and they have to act on it themselves? There are strong hints that such feelings already exist. Again via IPM, this time for July 12, is this report from al-Bayyna, a weekly paper issued by the Hezbollah movement in Iraq:

Sources close to a member of the dissolved Governing Council said many Shia organisations have been formed to confront the terrorist groups of Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, and Saddam supporters who have returned to work under different names. The sources said the Shia organisations will practice killing and kidnapping the Arab lawyers who plan to defend Saddam. The Shia groups also will punish all those who target the police and Iraqi establishments. These organisations will be the alternate force of Iyad Allawi in this critical phase. Many Turkmen, Sunni and Faili Kurds forces have joined these organisations.

But this threat of pro-government terrorism doesn't seem to have deterred the insurgents.

(CNN, July 15) A suicide attacker detonated a car bomb Wednesday outside the fortified enclave housing the headquarters of Iraq's interim government, killing at least 10 people, and gunmen in northern Iraq assassinated a provincial governor.

The bombing - which also wounded 40 people - was the worst attack in the capital since the United States transferred power to the Iraqis on June 28. The violence sent a strong signal that insurgents view the new government as an extension of the U.S. occupation. ...

Hours later, insurgents tossed hand grenades and fired machine guns at a convoy transporting Nineveh Gov. Osama Youssef Kashmoula, killing him and two of his guards, Iraqi and U.S. military officials said.

Iraq, drowning in guns to a degree that would give Wayne LaPierre an orgasm, is a nation that in a sense lost its identity when Saddam was taken down, in just the same way that Yugoslavia did when Tito died. That Iraqi identity may have been artificial, it was surely unjust and maintained by cruelty and repression, but it existed. And now a multitude of voices are trying to create a new Iraqi identity, usually in their own image, because they have no faith in, no trust in, any other course.

Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has reached agreements with the leaders of the organizations and political movements to dismantle all private militias and merge them into the new Iraqi army.

However, there is no certainty this will happen. The Kurds alone will be allowed to keep their own army, numbering close to 220,000 troops. Kurdistan will continue to have full autonomous status. ...

The next stage in building the Iraqi government is convening the National Congress of around 1,000 delegates, whose job will be to propose an agreed way of elections for a parliament. The convention is scheduled for the beginning of July in Dukhan, in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.

The convention will determine the image of the new Iraqi government, which cynics in Kurdistan suggest will be a Shi'ite state with a conservative religious orientation.

"From such a regime and such a state we can expect nothing," said a senior Kurdish official. "This may be the time to declare an independent Kurdish State."

When Tito died, Yugoslavia ruptured in a cacophony of ethnic bloodshed running up to genocide as long-suppressed rivalries and hatreds emerged to take their vengeance for injuries real or imagined, injuries done to people or simply to pride. Iraq hasn't gone that far yet - but the sad truth is, there is good reason to think - to fear - it will.

Footnote: As an illustration of how the media works, it took me about a half-hour of trying various keyword combinations with Google to come up with the linked ABC News item about the murders and mutilations of the Shiite truck drivers in Fallujah in June - and then I found it indirectly. There were thousands of links about the murders and mutilations of the American truck drivers in April - but hardly any about this. Take it as an indication of what and who is regarded as important.