The fifth W is "why?"

There has, naturally, been a lot of coverage of the fighting in Najaf. As I write this, the news is of a "major assault" on the city by US-Iraqi (which as a practical matter means US) forces, including the seizure of Moqtada al-Sadr's house and blocking access to the Imam Ali mosque. A lot of words and cyberink have been expended on the "difficulties" the situation presents to the "new government" of Ayad Allawi and on the "risk" of "inflaming" Shiites if the mosque is damaged. But at least by comparison, precious little attention has been paid to what I think is an equally important question: Why did this happen and what does it mean?

The eruption of violence in Najaf and Sadr City in Baghdad came as more of a surprise to us, that is, the US public, than it should have. Three weeks earlier, on July 15, the Christian Science Monitor reported that

[h]undreds of militiamen loyal to rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are rearming in their sanctuary in the Shiite holy city of Najaf in possible preparation for a new offensive, say US and Iraqi officials here. ...

"They are preparing for something, gathering weapons; people are coming in buses from other parts of Iraq," says Michael al-Zurufi, the Iraqi security adviser of Najaf Province.

(I actually mentioned this back on July 24 but in a different context, that of the question of possible Iranian involvement in Iraq, a very sore spot for many Iraqis.)

The same article said that

In response, US and Iraqi commanders are fine-tuning contingency plans for possible attacks in the city, while bolstering newly recruited Iraqi police and national guard units with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.

That is, they were preparing for an outbreak of fighting, which may be why it so quickly became "the most intense fighting in this holy city since the fall of Saddam Hussein." There were suggestions that the decision had been made to try to put the rebels down hard, supposedly the better for long-term security. Present actions would appear to validate those notions, to say the least.

The immediate genesis of the fighting appears a little vague. In addition to the underlying tension drawn from reports of the Mahdi Army rearming itself, there had been some incidents. For example, on August 2 the Daily Telegraph (UK) reported that

American troops have been involved in gun battles with supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr, after they surrounded the rebel cleric's house.

Armoured vehicles were used to help seal off the neighbourhood in the Iraqi city of Najaf where al-Sadr lives, before the US troops, backed by Iraqi security forces, began exchanging fire with the cleric's Mehdi Army.

The violence comes two days after the arrest by multinational forces of Sheikh Mithal al-Hasnawi, a senior lieutenant of al-Sadr in Karbala.

But it appears the proximate cause arose in Basra, where the Daily Star (Lebanon) says Mahdi militiamen

declared holy war against British forces based in Iraq's main southern city of Basra following the arrest of four of their comrades.

Sheikh Saad al-Basri ... accused British forces of arresting the four Sadr supporters in order to "create in Basra, the state of crisis that exists in Najaf."

The forces in Najaf, quite possibly ready, even eager, for a justification to restart the shooting, took the opportunity and attacked a police station. US Marines were called in for help, and the fighting quickly escalated.

The Miami Herald for August 6 says

The accounts given by the Mahdi Army and the Marines about what triggered the day's violence differed.

The Marines said the provincial governor called them in after Mahdi forces stormed a police station in Najaf first at 1 a.m. Thursday, then again two hours later, using AK-47s, RPGs and mortars. ...

Sadr's camp, on the other hand, said the Marines circled the city in the early morning hours, and made a push toward the downtown district. Spokesmen for Sadr said the Marines were carrying through on a recent pattern of hostility....

But I don't find those account in conflict if you note the implied chronology. The militia attacks a police station. The Marines, blaming the militia for the fighting, move in to counterattack. The militia, seeing themselves as having launched an attack on a "symbol of the occupation" but not directly on US forces, figure the US should have observed the "truce" and kept out of it and so the fighting is the US's fault. Rather than conflicting accounts, I see a disturbing asymmetry of perceptions.

The term comes out of strategizing about nuclear war. It means a situation in which each side looks at the same set of facts and responds in a way that seems to them entirely reasonable and rational - but because the sides perceive the facts differently, they interpret them differently, leading to greater conflict.

The classic example of this in nuclear war thinking is the US policy of "counterforce," which argues there is a "ladder of escalation" extending beyond conventional war through "tactical" (i.e., on the battlefield) use of nuclear weapons and then "limited" nuclear war before you get to "strategic" (that is, total) war. The escalation, it's believed, could be stopped at any rung. That made the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict more likely, since the conviction was that use of battlefield nukes did not mean an escalation to strategic nukes. The problem was, at the time the posture was adopted, the Soviet Union, as it was then, maintained there was an absolute firewall between conventional and nuclear weapons and once that wall was breached, the fire would spread uncontrollably. That is, once any nuclear weapons were used anywhere in a conflict, escalation to total war was inevitable.

That is an asymmetry of perceptions and the danger was that in the event of a military confrontation it made the US more likely to do the very things that would lead the USSR to engage in all-out nuclear war.

Here, a similar asymmetry - the militiamen expecting the US would not get directly involved and the US military thinking of course we will - may have produced the final breakdown of the always-tenuous truce. That, of course, is speculation, but I think we have to get past simply recording who shot who and who blew up what and think about the hows and more important whys of what's going on, even if it is speculation or "mere" opinion (so long as its labeled as such). Throw out ideas, see which ones stand up to scrutiny in the light of later developments, the better to understand and predict future ones and chart the best course, the one that affords the most justice for the least harm. (I've already stated my conviction that there is literally no way out of the disaster we have created in Iraq that will not pass through pain and bloodshed, and the first thing we who seek for nonviolent answers and means have to do is admit that. The question is not if there will be more blood spilled, but rather how much of whose - and who will do the spilling.)

I've offered my own thoughts about Moqtada al-Sadr before; in fact, I think my discussions of events surrounding the April insurrection have on the whole held up well. I made a number of comments during that time, but the thread was this: Feeling under threat (his newspaper closed, a chief aide arrested, a old warrant for his arrest being talked up), Sadr lashed out, expecting a more widespread uprising than occurred. Then, realizing he'd gone too far but unwilling (and/or feeling politically unable) to back down, he issued a series of conflicting statements varying between threatening and conciliatory while he tried to feel his way along to some kind of resolution. The early-June truce agreement, while unsatisfying for all involved, was still the best of what was to be had.

From then until he gave a public sermon on July 23, a period of nearly two months, Sadr was rarely seen in public. So rarely, in fact, that there were rumors he had left the country, al-Jazeera reported on July 24.

Why did he virtually disappear at a moment that so many - particularly among the bloggers, it seemed to me - were gloomily describing as his moment of victory, the moment when the US had to back down and back off? Precisely because, I believe, he or at least those around him didn't see it as a victory. Opposition within Najaf was growing, there were reports of what might be termed hit squads who assassinated several of his militia in the city, his resources had been drained, and perhaps most importantly, there had been no wider uprising - instead, he was eventually repudiated by most major Shiite clerics.

That, however, did not move his supporters, who remain passionately committed to him. For one example, on Tuesday the Guardian (UK) described one group of militiamen in Najaf this way:

They were a platoon from Khalis, a small Shia town just north of Baghdad, and had arrived in Najaf to fight four months ago. Several wore green silk headbands, signifying their commitment to "martyrdom".

So passionate are his supporters, in fact, that it can legitimately be asked, as I have before, how much is Sadr leading this movement and how much is it leading him? And while it's still a good question, I may be coming to a different answer than I did in days past. To start with, the July 15 CSM article said

[u]ncertainty remains over whether the militia activity is unified and sanctioned by Sadr or primarily the work of factions of his lieutenants, the officials say.

Some chalk that up to the desire of the US and the interim government to maintain a hands-off posture toward Sadr himself, and if it was the only indication I'd be inclined to agree. But it's not.

For one thing, there was the little matter of the report last month that he had been stabbed as the result of an argument over how far he could go without the approval of his office.

And additional conflicting statements, again varying between threatening and conciliatory, that have come out since the ceasefire continue to indicate a lack of a clear, unified direction.

For example, in June, Sadr's office dismissed the importance of Allawi's decree that militias that would not disband would not be allowed to take part in elections by saying "we are not a militia. We are a popular and radical movement and we are not looking for political posts." But the Guardian noted that

Mr Sadr has refused to take part in Iraq's political process, although he appears to be preparing to contest the elections which are due to be held next January.

For another, referring again to the CSM article:

Posters of Sadr are plastered around the zone, an indication of his popularity, especially among young people. Still, many others live in fear under the shadow of the militia's heavily armed enforcers. ...

Militia men often "arrest" residents and take them before an Islamic court that the government had sought to outlaw. Crimes include "criticizing Moqtada, selling movies and CDs, listening to music," says Michael al-Zurufi. "Even if you only swear at the militia they will arrest you and beat you up with cables and big sticks."

But according to the July 29 Iraqi Press Monitor, al-Mutamar, the daily paper of the Iraqi National Congress reported that

Muqtada al-Sadr has ordered the creation of a committee to deal with removing pictures of him that adversely affect him and his movement. Sadr had been told that some of his supporters had forced people to put his pictures on the buildings and the stores, otherwise they would be punished. He denounced the misbehaviour of some of his supporters, describing them as "spies and malicious". ... He said a committee would be formed to look into the claims of Najaf people offended by his followers.

More recently, in his July 23 sermon, as quoted by al-Jazeera,

al-Sadr denounced the interim prime minister calling him an extension of the occupation.

"Damn him and damn the occupier," al-Sadr told the faithful, who gathered in the grand mosque in Kufa, 150km south of Baghdad.

What's more, in a sermon read on his behalf last Friday, he blamed the US for all violence in Iraq, calling it "our enemy and the enemy of the people," following that up in a press interview on Tuesday by declaring "I am the enemy of America from now until judgment day." AP quoted him as saying

"I will continue fighting," the young, firebrand cleric told reporters in Najaf. "I will remain in Najaf city until the last drop of my blood has been spilled."

Yet the very next day, CNN reports,

he issued a statement ... saying he would welcome help from the United Nations in solving the crisis.

"I have no problem cooperating [with the U.N.]," the statement said. "We hope for this interference during these hard times to help us establish a world of peace and prosperity far away from wars and occupation."

Which is a little odd because back in January, he called the UN "dishonest."

Because of all this, I may be changing my mind about Sadr. I've suggested before that in the April uprising he came to realize that he'd overplayed his hand; I even referred to an old riff about Jesse Jackson: "Another risk any leader runs is generating a tide that can carry you places you're not sure you want to go." But I can't help but notice now that for the most part, the "fight to the death" talk comes from Sadr himself while the more conciliatory statements come from his office or his representatives. Could I have had it backwards? Instead of Sadr realizing he'd overreached could it have been his aides? Instead of Sadr reining in his supporters could it have been that he was the one reined in?

That makes sense to me in part because it would resolve a conflict in my previous thinking. I wrote on April 14 that "Sadr ... is talking like he's preparing for some kind of martyrdom," urging his followers "not to let my killing put an end to their rejection of the occupation." It's a theme he has returned to a number of times, most recently on Wednesday, saying in a statement to his followers "I hope that you keep fighting even if you see me detained or martyred."

Indeed, Matthew Rothschild, editor of The Progressive, notes that the magazine

ran an article in our June issue [not available online] about al-Sadr, and the guy has a serious martyr complex, according to reporter Nir Rosen. Al-Sadr's father and his great uncle both were killed for resisting Saddam Hussein's regime, and al-Sadr wants to become the "third martyr," as he puts it.

Sadr's father was Grand Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr,

who was killed in 1999 by agents presumed to be working for then-president Saddam Hussein, thus becoming one of the major symbols of Shi'ite resistance to the former regime.

I did find it somewhat difficult to reconcile the two images: one of a man expecting, even desiring, martyrdom; the other of a man making a cautious political calculation. If, however, it's the people around him who are the cautious ones, who press him to hold back a little, to leave himself a way out, to - if you will - live to fight another day, then things make more sense (or are at least less convoluted).

Still, it's unlikely Sadr's supporters in the streets are concerned with such internal machinations. They are, as has been noted repeatedly, largely young, male, unemployed city-dwellers who feel (with cause) they have been passed over in the reconstruction of Iraq and left to slowly rot. In Sadr they have a voice for their frustration and through him a target for their rage.

Which means, ultimately, the fight against the Mahdi Army is one against men who feel they have nothing to lose led by a man who expects to be martyred. Surrender does not appear to be in the gameplan. As AP reported on Wednesday,

"I think they got a reproduction facility down there. I think they're cloning," Capt. Patrick McFall said, referring to the militant's tenacity in the face of repeated assaults. As he spoke, a mortar exploded nearby, sending up plumes of black smoke. ...

On Tuesday, U.S. helicopter gunships pummeled a multistory building 400 meters (yards) from the shrine with rockets, missiles and 30 mm cannons. The military said about 20 people were killed inside the building.

By Wednesday, more militants had entered the scorched hotel to resume firing at troops.

"We keep pushing south and they just keep coming," said Capt. Patrick McFall, from the 1st Cavalry Division.

So what ultimately happens? Perhaps another ceasefire, but this time I don't see US forces agreeing to withdraw from the city. I will also go out on a thin limb here and say I don't think there will be the "explosion" of Shiite resistance some are predicting as a result of the assault unless it actually results in damage to the mosque itself. The fighting has, obviously, spread to other towns but those are areas where Sadr already had armed supporters. Now, there have indeed been protests. AP's Wednesday report also said

In response to the fighting, thousands of protesters took to the streets in the southern city of Nasiriyah, condemning what they called a U.S. attack on holy sites and chanting slogans against interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.

The demonstrators also pelted the local offices of Allawi's National Accord Party with stones and one broke in and set it on fire.

Nonetheless, I suspect that expressions of outrage on Sadr's behalf are as widespread as they are going to get and will grow only if a threat is perceived to the Shiite religion itself (which an attack on the mosque would likely appear to be) rather than to Sadr or his movement. Admittedly, this is speculation on my part but I'm putting it down here to later be referred to as thoughtful insight or hopefully forgotten as embarrassing nonsense, depending on how events unfold. And I want to emphasize that what I'm saying does not have to do with the extent or depth of opposition to US occupation but with the extent or depth of support for Sadr, my underlying point being that the former far outstrips the latter.

In a way, Sadr is the equivalent of John Kerry. Kerry is the "Anybody But Bush" candidate; Sadr is the "Anybody but the Occupiers" leader. His capture, I maintain, would produce outrage among his supporters but no general insurrection among others. Just as, if Kerry had not won the primaries, whoever did would be enjoying the same passionate support, so Shiites, driven by opposition to US forces rather than devotion to Sadr, doubtless will have others to support if Sadr is in some way removed from the picture.

But if that's true, and I'm convinced it is, the important thing to realize here is that all this just shows what was already obvious: The ultimate source of the present strife is indeed the presence of US and other foreign forces in Iraq.

Removing those forces will not end the violence; there are still many internal conflicts now suppressed by the existence of the common enemy, conflicts which surely will bubble up whenever those troops do finally leave.

But still the bottom line remains: Even if removing the troops will not stop further bloodshed, the bloodshed will not stop until the troops are removed.

Set the damn date and get the hell out.