And it may also reveal an answer to a question I've been wondering about: Just how much control does Moqtada al-Sadr have over "his" Mahdi Army?
I admit I was doubtful about Ali al-Sistani's initiative. I only became confident that something would actually come of it when I heard that as part of the agreement, Sadr had agreed to a specific deadline by which his supporters would leave the Imam Ali shrine. Without that, it could easily have become just another talk session.
Recall some of the recent chronology: Sadr refused to meet himself with a delegation from the Iraqi National Conference who were carrying a peace proposal, leaving them to lower-level officials. But the next day, he "accepted" that same proposal. However, he wanted to "negotiate the terms of implementation" but only with representatives of the conference. He also insisted there be a ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces from the city first - something I knew the US and Allawi would not accept, as it would in effect restore the status quo that existed before this latest outbreak of violence.
Sadr, who had previously insisted that he would not deal with the "illegitimate" Allawi government, then said he wanted to meet with the same national conference delegation he would not meet with before - and they could bring along a representative of the interim government. His representatives keep insisting he wanted to arrange a ceasefire as the military pressure increased.
(Sidebar: I can't help but comment that for someone who has been described by a number of people - including me - as having a "martyr complex," Sadr seems singularly adept at avoiding final confrontations.)
So while I was convinced that Sistani's intentions were honest (the fact that he came back somewhat early from his recuperation from an angioplasty added weight to that notion), I wasn't sure he could pull it off, despite his undeniable stature and influence.
My doubts grew when Sadr's supposed acceptance of Sistani's proposals were followed by bickering over the handover of the keys to the mosque, the symbolic transfer of authority. In effect, Sadr wanted to hand over the keys while his supporters still occupied the grounds, which would have involved Sistani at least symbolically in the defense of the mosque against any attack by US or Iraqi forces. Sistani didn't bite and Sadr, slowly but surely losing ground militarily and facing what most observers said was certain defeat, relented and agreed to a specific time by which his supporters would leave the mosque.
That was the key that enabled Allawi to agree as well: Sadr was no longer talking about leaving or negotiating about leaving, he was leaving. The unacceptable status quo was no longer. And even if the "victory" was in significant ways symbolic, since it involved a pledge to take no action against Sadr or his militia, still it was enough because it did not represent "backing down," which well could have been disastrous for Allawi's fragile reign.
US military commanders also agreed even though they were not happy about it. They were in no position to say "no" when Allawi said "yes" and still maintain the fiction that Allawi's government is the ultimate authority.
And so
[t]he crisis appeared resolved Friday morning when al-Sadr issued a statement broadcast over the shrine's loudspeakers ordering his Mahdi Army militia fighters to lay down their arms and leave Najaf and Kufa.But where the crisis ends, the questions start. Again, Sadr specifically called on his followers to leave Najaf and Kufa without their weapons.
"To all my brothers in the Mahdi Army ... you should leave Kufa and Najaf without your weapons, along with the peaceful masses," his statement said.
Thousands of Shiite pilgrims, who had come at the behest of al-Sistani, streamed into the shrine and mixed with the militants who had been holed up inside. The whole group then filed out, with some of the militants defiantly chanting, "Muqtada, Muqtada."
The doors of the shrine were then shut and the keys were handed over to al-Sistani's office, a symbolic and crucial step in ending the crisis.
"Do this so they won't condemn you and they won't condemn me," the speaker said, reading a letter from al-Sadr over the mosque's sound system.And indeed, dozens of Kalashnikov rifles were piled in front of Sadr's office and a senior al-Sadr representative said most Mahdi Army members had turned in their weapons.
[B]ut thousands of others were believed to be still armed, and some were seen pushing carts full of machine-guns and rocket launchers through a narrow alley.Which raises the question I offered at the beginning: How much does Sadr actually control "his" militia? As part of the truce in June, his supporters who were not from Najaf were supposed to leave and go home. But as I noted in a post on August 12, not all of them did. So how many of them now will heed his call not only to leave the city but to surrender their weapons before they do? How much is Sadr in charge?
Almost unknown to the world before its violent uprising last April against US forces in Baghdad and elsewhere [the Christian Science Monitor reported on Thursday], the Mahdi Army is emerging as a well-organized parallel government that aspires to govern Shiites according to its religious principles. Its models are the violent militant organizations (designated as terrorists groups by the US) with social programs like Lebanon's Hizbullah and Hamas in Gaza, and its goals are at least as ambitious.I don't know what reaction he had to the agreement to leave the shrine or if he really had any reaction at all. The point here is that he identified the struggle in terms of the fighters, not in terms of Sadr. No matter how much personal allegiance there may be, no matter now much he stands as a symbol, it seems to me that the Mahdi Army as a movement is outgrowing Sadr.
In most cities where the Mahdi Army is present, there are Mahdi Army religious courts for resolving disputes and punishing criminals; Mahdi Army police patrols; and even Mahdi Army town councils for planning social programs.
All of these services pay political dividends, earning the admiration of many Shiites who don't necessarily support Sadr or his militia. ...
[I]n Sadr City, the news from Najaf seemed quite distant. For Mahdi Army fighters here, the war is just beginning. And even for those who have been severely wounded say they are preparing for the next battle.
Abu Hassan, one of Hassan's patients, says the fighters in Najaf will stay and fight to the last man. "This is their home territory, and their own families will encourage them to fight and die, and then they will go to heaven," he says.
Two tests of that will come up soon: One, will Najaf and Kufa really become "no weapons zones?" Or just "no weapons seen in the open right now zones?" The other is how will other towns with a Mahdi Army presence react? What, in particular, will happen in Sadr City, which is seeing its own war of attrition, except that, unlike Najaf, it's unclear who's being attritted?
A witness said a U.S. tank shelled targets along the volatile Haifa Street in central Baghdad, a dangerous stretch that has earned the nickname "Little Falluja."This is not the end. It is at most a transition.
Small arms fire and explosions were heard in the morning hours, and 12 U.S. troops were wounded in hand-grenade attacks. Eight people have been detained.
Footnote: In a noble attempt at spin,
[a]l-Sadr spokesman Sheikh Ahmed al-Sheibani on Friday said a critical point had been made in the three-week standoff - to prove to the United States and the interim Iraqi government that religious authority is the primary power in Iraq.Of course, since Sadr had supposedly accepted a peace proposal from the national conference and had declared his willingness to negotiate with them (and even to involve a member of the Allawi government) before Sistani got involved, it's kind of hard to credit that argument, but it's still a good attempt. Not up to Shrub's standards, certainly, but hey, they're not as experienced.
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