More tidbits

A few other not well-reported tidbits from the Duelfer report on Saddam's non-existent WMDs, drawn from an article in the Washington Post for October 7. (Quotes are from the article, not directly from the report.)

- Saddam Hussein "was not motivated by a desire to strike the United States with banned weapons, but wanted them to enhance his image in the Middle East and to deter Iran, against which Iraq had fought a devastating eight-year war."

- He dreamed of restarting his weapons programs after sanctions were lifted, but had no formal strategy or plan to do it. "Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam" set to take up the work.

- There was "no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing a mobile biological weapons production system." The two trailers found "almost certainly" for exactly what Iraq said they were for: the generation of hydrogen gas.

- There was nothing to support claims that Iraq sought uranium from Africa "or any other country after 1991.... The only two contacts with Niger that were discovered were an invitation to the president of Niger to visit Baghdad, and a visit to Baghdad by a Niger minister in 2001 seeking petroleum products for cash. There was one offer to Iraq of 'yellowcake' uranium, and that was from a Ugandan businessman offering uranium from Congo. The deal was turned down, and the Ugandan was told that Baghdad was not interested because of the sanctions."

- Even as the report presented as a key finding that (quoting from the report) "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a chemical weapons effort when sanctions were lifted," the Post notes that the evidence included "is described [in the report itself] as 'extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial.' The report quotes a single scientist who reached that conclusion in hindsight and based on information he learned from the U.S. inspection team long after U.S. troops had captured Iraq."

The very first item in that list particularly interests me because of something I wrote way back in the old days: January 1991, in the days preceding the start of Gulf War I. I was discussing the possibility of avoiding war, a possibility I thought bleak at best.

Saddam Hussein is brutal to the point of cruelty and ambitious to the point of arrogance, but he's neither mad nor unpredictable. Indeed, it seems more rational to take him at his word. Right now, that means he will not simply withdraw from Kuwait. To do so would not only put him back in the same bind from which his invasion was intended to rescue him, but it could brand him as another fallen hero in the eyes of the Arab masses from which he draws his support, another leader who ultimately could not stand up to the West. Neither his personal ambitions nor his political calculations could accept such a prospect. ...

So what now? The widely-speculated 11th hour gesture from Saddam appears less and less likely; he seems as determined not to look "weak" as Bush is. But what he may try is a 13th hour gesture: Saddam the political gambler could, for example, let the deadline pass, then offer a schedule for withdrawal from Kuwait in return for a commitment to an international conference on Mideast issues. In terms of stalling for time and trading a larger gain for a smaller one, it'd be as good as anything done before the 15th - but the difference in image would be enormous: He could present himself as the savior of Arab pride who successfully defied the Americans by ignoring the deadline, and the "minor adjustments of our borders" resulting from withdrawal could be easily forgotten.

That is, I was saying that Saddam's standing in the Arab world occupied a central place in, if it was not the core of, his political calculations. Apparently, after nearly 14 years the CIA has caught up with me.

Footnote: Links to the key findings and to the entire text of the report can be found here. Warning: The entire report, in .pdf format, is nearly 200mb.