Middle East Bushit

So now we're getting told that oh yes, the Middle East is changing by the minute, changing rapidly, changing just the way George Bush said it would and omigosh, he's actually a brilliant and Great Leader who had it right all along and aren't you embarrassed, all you in the antiwar crowd who have been proven so wrong?

Writing in the March 14 issue of Newsweak (that's not a typo), eager acolyte Fareed Zakaria, after approvingly noting Tip O'Neil's famed aphorism "all politics is local," declared that

[t]he other noted political scientist who has been vindicated in recent weeks is George W. Bush. Across New York, Los Angeles and Chicago - and probably Europe and Asia as well - people are nervously asking themselves a question: "Could he possibly have been right?" The short answer is yes.

The editorially-liberal newspaper The Independent (UK) chimed in on Tuesday that

[n]o one imagined that events would so soon cause the President's opponents around the world to question whether he had got it right. ...

[E]ven his most grudging domestic opponents and his harshest critics in the region admit that Mr Bush is ... in part responsible

for events "suggest[ing] the political straitjacket that has long imprisoned the Arab world is loosening, if not yet coming apart at the seams."

Actually, this is less of a question being asked than a triumphalist cry by the rightwingers while the pitiful Dummycrats mumble about "good for George" and rush to change the subject. For example, troglodyte Jeff Jacoby, in Thursday's Boston Globe, gloats that "[t]he Axis of Weasel is crying uncle, and much of the chorus is singing from the same songsheet" and supplies a number of quotes to back it up. Then there's this:

"What changed the climate in the Middle East was not just the US invasion and show of arms," exults the commentator Charles Krauthammer in Time magazine. "It was US determination and staying power, and the refusal of its people last November to turn out a president who rejected an 'exit strategy'."

(Of course, this was the same Charles Kookhammer who before the war said it precisely was the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein that would in 18 months turn Iraq into a shining beacon of democracy that would generate burgeoning change across the region. But at least this shift in argument is a relatively smooth one, as opposed to the jagged 1984 shifts ["the invasion of Iraq was always about 'freedom for Iraq,' not WMDs"] at which the wingers are traditionally adept.)

In the face of this wave of gleeful harangues on the one side and sullen acquiescence on the other, the temptation is to simply to raise the appropriate finger in a gesture of defiance. But let's be honest here: Did Shrub have anything to do with the vague possibility of changes that are appearing in a few places in the region? Yes, he did - but, my friends, wait for the punch line.

But first, it's surely worth noting that even some of those who try so hard to credit Bush with some brilliant, overarching, strategic insight and want to celebrate his supposed correctness are forced to admit, ultimately, that there is less here than meets the eye. The Independent notes that "[h]ow much Mr. Bush is responsible for these development is debatable." And the fawning Zakaria, after deifying Bush for being "fundamentally right about some big things" - specifically, that the roots of Islamic terrorism lie in the "deep dysfunctions" of the Arab world, i.e., the bigoted notion that the Arab world is "backward" - and, bizarrely, praising his ignorance of the Middle East because it (supposedly) enabled him to maintain "a vision of what the region could look like," winds up admitting that

[i]t is easier to imagine liberal democracy than to achieve it. ... There have been more than 50 elections in Africa in the past 15 years ... but only a few of those countries can be described as free. Haiti has had elections and American intervention, and still has foreign troops stationed there. Yet only a few of these elections have led to successful and free societies. ...

If Bush is to be credited for the benefits of his policies, he must also take responsibility for their costs. Over the past three years, his administration has racked up enormous costs, many of which could easily have been lowered or avoided altogether. ...

Perhaps an even more lasting cost is the broad and deep shifts in public opinion against America around the world. Look at countries as disparate as Britain, Poland, Turkey and Japan, all allies of the United States. In every one of them, public views have changed significantly in the past few years, and being pro-American is now a political liability.

Jacoby, for his part, admits

this triumphalism makes me uneasy. This is the Middle East we're talking about, after all. And we have been here before.

Another Bush-booster, Howard Fineman, wrote in Newsweak that "it's too soon to know" whether there is any actual change going on. "The verdict won't be in for decades." Zakaria doesn't think it will take that long, but he does say that

[i]f, five years from now, Iraq, Afghanistan and perhaps an independent Palestine and a democratic Lebanon are thriving countries with modern political and economic systems, America will be honored and respected.... If, on the other hand, these countries are chaotic and troubled - more like Central Asia than Central Europe - people there will blame America.

Or, put more simply "if everything goes exactly our way we'll be cool - but I have no idea what will happen." So much for the high confidence Shrub was "right about some big things."

So given all that, just what is the big deal? What is all the shouting about? Is anything actually happening?

Well, yes, something is, but not nearly as much as the rightists would have you think and certainly not for the reasons they advance.

What really got the rightwing pumped was the events in Lebanon triggered by the murder of former prime minister Rafik Hariri. The opposition suspected it was a Syrian hit and their fury exploded into a series of street demonstrations that resulted in the resignation of the pro-Syrian government. The pullback of Syrian troops with the promise of their withdrawal from Lebanon where they have been since intervening in the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war was probably related to those same events. US officials dubbed it the "Cedar Revolution" and compared it to the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine. Rooted in a Christian-Druze alliance in opposition to Syria's dominance of Lebanon's political life, the actions were certainly impressive and a clear demonstration of people power.

But that power may prove insufficient. It may well prove to not even be the real voice of the people.

Omar Karami, Lebanon's pro-Syrian prime minister, was reappointed yesterday, raising the prospect of fresh street protests and renewed confrontation with the opposition that forced him to quit 10 days ago.

His appeal for opposition parties to join a government of national unity until elections in May was immediately rejected. ...

Mr Karami was reappointed by President Émile Lahoud, another politician with close links to Damascus, after securing the votes of a majority of the 128 MPs,

the Daily Telegraph (UK) said in its Friday edition. Lahoud was required to reappoint Karami once the majority of MPs nominated him. The possibility of further street action by opponents may depend on what kind of government Karami manages to pull together since

[o]pposition leaders in Beirut told The Washington Times [Wednesday] they were not particularly concerned with Mr. Karami's expected reappointment

since it should be only a caretaker government until the elections.

Significantly, between the time of Karami's resignation and reappointment, the Lebanon-based militant group Hizbollah, popular for its long and ultimately successful effort to force an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, staged a pro-Syrian rally that, in Reuters' description, "dwarfed previous protests in Beirut demanding the Syrians leave." Which raises a genuine question of whether or not the majority of Lebanese want the Syrians to go. Perhaps they do, but current events most assuredly do not give a clear answer.

Writing in the Guardian (UK) for Friday, Professor Charles Harb of the American University of Beirut offers a sobering assessment. The "rosy picture" of "an inexorable movement towards freedom and democracy," he writes,

fails to take into account the socio-political structures of Lebanese society. Its governance is built on a sectarian and feudal consensual system. It is an aggregate of religious minority groups that coalesce around local feudal lords in return for services. Each sect is given a clear share of power. For example, the president of the country has to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the head of parliament a Shia Muslim. Governance tends to be built on consensus between the various parties, leaving no room for accountability or programmatic politics. When major differences between the factions emerge, the country is thrown into crisis. And when external players get involved, crisis has the potential to turn into civil war. That was the case first in 1952, again in 1958 and 1969, culminating in the 15-year civil war between 1975 and 1990.

It may be that the current situation is no different. With increasing economic problems, friction between the parties was already growing. The geopolitical earthquake triggered by the war on Iraq was tightening the security noose in Lebanon.

What's more, he notes, Shia Muslims have not joined the opposition: "'Lebanon' is not united behind current developments." And some of the opposition leaders "are the same autocratic warlords who tore the country apart 15 years ago and have been undemocratically jousting for power ever since." But most importantly for the present discussion,

freedom of expression and democratic practices were not suddenly born with Hariri's assassination [emphasis added]. Lebanon's media is one of the freest in the Middle East, and its consensual democratic system has been in place for decades.

Or, again put more simply, the crisis in Lebanon was visible long before, and didn't have a flipping thing to do with, George Shrub's "soaring rhetoric about freedom and liberty and human rights." (The quote is from a column by Christopher Dickey, who, interestingly, went on to suggest Glorious Leader - again ignoring European advice - may be about to screw up Lebanon by making it about Syria rather than Lebanon itself.)

But Our Only President's grand - not to say grandiose - words bring us back to the original questions of what changes have there been and what credit the Bushites can take for them. The Independent has a convenient list (called "Winds of Change") of some countries in the region, so let's run them down.

Libya - "No sign yet of democracy arriving...." Scratch that, then.

The Palestinian Authority - "Palestinians voted for a new president in January's free elections and a parliamentary poll is set for July." Yes, but what did that have to do with Shrub? The single most important related event was the death of Yasser Arafat and the single most important change was the exhaustion on both sides with the bloodshed. (It might be mentioned that there had been municipal elections under the PA before, albeit not for a few years. This is not to make Arafat a democrat but it remains true that these were not the first elections among the Palestinians.)

Syria - "Washington and Damascus are locked in a dialogue of the deaf. President Bashar Assad refuses to relinquish his trump cards (support for Hizbollah and radical Palestinians) as long as conflict with Israel over Golan Heights continues." No sign of change there, either.

Iraq - There was, of course, The Election and, the idea goes, a constitution by October. The Independent says it will "enshrin[e] personal, political and religious freedoms," but just how in hell it knows what the final document will "enshrine" is beyond me. Meanwhile, "a bloody insurgency continues to mar progress." No shit, Sherlock. And let's not forget that the whole idea of elections was forced on the US by the insistence of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Credit to Bush: nil.

Yemen - "Yemen is a fragile not a failed state. A nascent democracy with the most open political system in the Arabian Peninsula...." No indication it was responding to Bush that I can find.

Bahrain - "Voted in 2001 to become a constitutional monarchy with elected parliament and independent judiciary." Preceded El Leader's "soaring rhetoric." Correlation factor: zero.

Qatar - "Greater political openness since current head of state came to power in 1995. Democratic elections were held in 1999." Not only preceded soaring rhetoric, preceded Bush.

Kuwait - "[P]arliament has agreed to speed up moves towards ... grant[ing] women the same political rights as men. The decision came amid noisy street rallies by women activists. ... But political parties remain outlawed." So again, a little progress, but because of the Shrub team? Hardly.

In fact, the example of Kuwait points up a very important point: The change was forced on the government by internal opposition. That factor is of great importance in considering what "winds of change" actually are blowing (or at least drifting) across the region. Consider the two "big" cases (other than Iraq and the PA) used to buttress the wingers' claims: Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In the former, President Hosni Mubarak has endorsed and obtained a change in the constitution that will allow a multiparty presidential election in September rather than the yes/no referendums on his rule there have been so far. But again, it's much less than it seems. Certainly the opposition is unimpressed because the emergency laws, which ban large gatherings and allow wide-ranging powers of detention, remain in force and many suspect this is simply a way for Mubarak to pass on the presidency to his son Gamel. But as commentator Amr Hamzawy notes in the March 10-16 issue of the Egyptian weekly al-Ahram,

for the first time in contemporary Egyptian history, the ruler of the country is making concessions in the face of mounting internal calls [emphasis added] for democratisation. Demonstrators in Cairo, rallying a few days ago for reform, now know that it is worthwhile to contest the power of the state and that public pressure can be effective in forcing change.

That is, it was internal dissent that forced "a slight opening of a previously closed door to pluralist politics." The same goes for Saudi Arabia. The municipal elections there were widely dismissed as irrelevant because of

the exclusion of women as voters and candidates, low levels of voter participation, the trivial powers assigned to the elected local councilors, and finally, the fact that voters made their choices on the basis of tribal loyalties.

As well as the fact that only half the seats were up for election. But that, again, is to miss the point. The fact that they happened at all, allowed by the Saudi royal family, which is, as the Independent put it, "fearful of change [and] accustomed to a system in which it holds enormous power and privileges," holds its own significance, especially considering that they were undertaken

in the face of stiff resistance from ultra-conservatives, especially among the clergy. ...

Elections at local level are seen as one way of opening up the system while preserving the status quo. Elected councillors will be able to discuss roads, sewage and street lighting, without, as one Saudi put it, getting into debates about "high politics",

the Guardian reported last month. The royal family, that is, while being reluctant to cede any authority, knows it can't simply do nothing. Quoting Hamzawy again,

it would be a mistake to judge the significance of Saudi municipal elections by using liberal benchmarks and ignoring the country's historical and cultural realities. The holding of municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, in spite of its shortcomings, is at least an opening in an authoritarian political system and a step towards greater citizen participation.

And he adds a very valid and important point, one often overlooked.

Moreover, the apparent influence of tribal loyalties and religious inclinations on voter preferences does not only represent an element of backwardness in the Saudi political spectrum but, and maybe more significantly, a source of pluralism. Throughout the 20th century, Arab nation-states attempted to modernise their societies by refusing to recognise their ethnic and religious diversity.

It was that tendency, the attempt to forge - usually by force - a "single people" out of a variety of ethnic and religious groups occupying boundaries often arbitrarily set by Western imperialist governments for administrative convenience instead of cultural or political continuity and then enforced by installed pro-West regimes, that more than any other factor generated the "deep dysfunctions" Zakaria ascribes to the region rather than the "backwardness" usually implicit in the phrase.

So now we're down to it, down to the $64,000 question. Yes, there has been some movement. Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar have clearly moved to embrace political pluralism. The PA has dodged its impending ossification. Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have been forced by internal opposition to open their systems, even if only a crack. So what does this have to do with George Bush? I said at the top that yes, he does get some of the credit but you should wait for the punch line.

Here it comes: George Bush's contribution has been to exert pressure on some of the governments - Egypt and the Saudis in particular - which emboldened that internal resistance in a way that otherwise would not have happened. That is, he adopted at least in his words, if not his practice, policies that the left has advocated for decades!

Which side is it - the right or the left - that has said all along that a concern for justice and human rights should be a centerpiece of our foreign policy? Which side is it that has said all along that we should be encouraging democratic opposition groups instead of contributing to their oppression? Which side is it that has said all along that our selfish economic self-interest can't be allowed to be the driving force behind our relations with other countries?

Now, by no means is Shrub suddenly becoming a leftist. Certainly his "vision" of "reform" involves nations becoming not liberal democracies (especially not ones like, say, Sweden) but liberal capitalist democracies worshipping at the altar of "free trade" and happily wrapped in the folds of corporate globalization. His "soaring rhetoric" of "freedom" means, at bottom, the "freedom" to be vassals of Wal-Mart.

But the fact remains - and yes, this is the punch line - that George Bush has contributed to any moves toward open political systems in the Middle East to the extent that, and only to the extent that, he has adopted the policies and attitudes of the left.

We are, we remain, the unconquered champions of change for the better. Hooray for us!

Footnote: One other place the wingers point to as embracing Bush-driven change is Afghanistan. Again, yes there has been some change. I remember taking a breath in a moment of quiet respect when I read of the announcement that a new constitution had been approved. But again, it is so much less than it seems. According to a March 9 article at the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission recently reported the results of a survey covering the years 1978-2001, from the Soviet invasion to the fall of the Taliban. It found that

[a] startling 70 per cent of respondents said that either they or a family member were victims of human rights violations during this time. And they are now demanding that something be done to punish the guilty.

But if the study found that most Afghans demand justice, the report also concluded that many remain highly sceptical that the country currently has the capacity to right past wrongs.

For example, the study found that close to 58 per cent of those surveyed do not trust the justice system in the country.

Part of the reason for this loss of faith seems to be the visible lack of redress. The report quotes people as saying that the abuses continue, and that many of those responsible for present and past misdeeds are still in power.

For example, the minister for water and energy and the recently-appointed chief-of-staff of the armed forces are known human rights abusers - and they apparently are not the only ones holding seats of power. In fact, things are so bad that some human rights advocates in the country were upset the report was released.

"The government itself is under the direct influence of the war criminals and Afghanistan's courts do not have the independence or authority to take them on," said Lal Gul, head of the Afghan Commission for Human Rights - a non-government organisation which despite its similar name is separate from the official AIHRC.

Lal Gul questioned the value of publishing such a report before the government is able to implement its findings.

Mohammad Sediq Patman, a political analyst, agreed, saying he fears that even raising the possibility of human rights trials might encourage those in power to destroy documents that could later be used against them.

It does not speak well of your situation when you believe that revealing the truth of your plight may do more to harm your cause than help it.