SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLYThe Times described Rycroft as a Downing Street foreign policy aide.
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
So what we have here is demonstrable proof that no later than July 2002
- the White House had not only decided to invade Iraq, it was actively planning for it,
- indeed, Donald Rumsfeld said they "had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure" on Saddam,
- that they had even established a rough timetable for a run-up to the war, "beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections" and ending in January, 2003,
- that this was being done even though "the case [for war] was thin" and "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy,"
- that "the NSC had no patience with the UN route," that is, they intended to attack regardless of any UN action pro or con,
- that the ultimatum ultimately delivered to Saddam about inspectors was the UK's idea for the purpose of creating a "political context" to justify an attack, and
- "there was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."
So why in the flaming hell is there no resolution of impeachment? I don't give two shits - or even one, for that matter - about "it wouldn't do any good." I don't give a damn if it has no chance! Some things you just do because they are right. Because the point is not even "can we win" but "how can we not try?" Any member of Congress - and I mean any member of Congress - who at this point is not willing to stand up and be counted is a disgrace to their office, a disgrace to their Constitutional duties, and a disgrace to this country.
Happily, there are some who are willing to at least raise the questions.
Eighty-eight members of Congress have signed a letter authored by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) calling on President Bush to answer questions about a secret U.S.-UK agreement to attack Iraq, RAW STORY has learned.In a "Dear Colleague" letter seeking signatures, Conyers also blasted the absence of any serious mainstream media attention to the damning document.
"Unfortunately, the mainstream media in the United States was too busy with wall-to-wall coverage of a 'runaway bride' to cover a bombshell report out of the British newspapers," Conyers writes. "We must not let this fall down the memory hole...."This is the text of the letter and an alphabetical list of signers to date:
May 5, 2005The hard part comes when they don't get the answers, as they won't. Then we'll see who stands for basic honesty and decency and who would rather squat cravenly on their ass.
Dear Mr. President:
We write because of troubling revelations in the Sunday London Times apparently confirming that the United States and Great Britain had secretly agreed to attack Iraq in the summer of 2002, well before the invasion and before you even sought Congressional authority to engage in military action. While various individuals have asserted this to be the case before, including Paul O'Neill, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, and Richard Clarke, a former National Security Council official, they have been previously dismissed by your Administration. However, when this story was divulged last weekend, Prime Minister Blair's representative claimed the document contained "nothing new." If the disclosure is accurate, it raises troubling new questions regarding the legal justifications for the war as well as the integrity of your own Administration.
The Sunday Times obtained a leaked document with the minutes of a secret meeting from highly placed sources inside the British Government. Among other things, the document revealed:
* Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired a July 2002 meeting, at which he discussed military options, having already committed himself to supporting President Bush's plans for invading Iraq.
* British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw acknowledged that the case for war was "thin" as "Saddam was not threatening his neighbours and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran."
* A separate secret briefing for the meeting said that Britain and America had to "create" conditions to justify a war.
* A British official "reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
As a result of this recent disclosure, we would like to know the following:
1) Do you or anyone in your Administration dispute the accuracy of the leaked document?
2) Were arrangements being made, including the recruitment of allies, before you sought Congressional authorization go to war? Did you or anyone in your Administration obtain Britain's commitment to invade prior to this time?
3) Was there an effort to create an ultimatum about weapons inspectors in order to help with the justification for the war as the minutes indicate?
4) At what point in time did you and Prime Minister Blair first agree it was necessary to invade Iraq?
5) Was there a coordinated effort with the U.S. intelligence community and/or British officials to "fix" the intelligence and facts around the policy as the leaked document states?
We have of course known for some time that subsequent to the invasion there have been a variety of varying reasons proffered to justify the invasion, particularly since the time it became evident that weapons of mass destruction would not be found. This leaked document - essentially acknowledged by the Blair government - is the first confirmation that the rationales were shifting well before the invasion as well.
Given the importance of this matter, we would ask that you respond to this inquiry as promptly as possible. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Neil Abercrombie (D-HI)
Brian Baird (D-WA)
Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
Xavier Becerra (D-CA)
Shelley Berkley (D-NV)
Sanford Bishop (D-NY)
Earl Blumenauer (D-OR)
Corrine Brown (D-FL)
Sherrod Brown (D-OH)
G.K. Butterfield (D-NC)
Donna M. Christensen (D-VI, delegate)
William Lacy Clay (D-MO)
Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO)
James Clyburn (D-SC)
John Conyers (D-MI)
Jim Cooper (D-TN)
Elijah Cummings (D-MD)
Danny Davis (D-IL)
Peter DeFazio (D-OR)
Diana DeGette (D-CO)
Bill Delahunt (D-MA)
Rosa DeLauro (D-CT)
Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)
Sam Farr (D-CA)
Bob Filner (D-CA)
Harold Ford, Jr. (D-TN)
Barney Frank (D-MA)
Al Green (D-TX)
Raul Grijalva (D-AZ)
Louis Gutierrez (D-IL)
Alcee Hastings (D-FL)
Maurice Hinchey (D-NY)
Rush Holt (D-NJ)
Jay Inslee (D-WA)
Jessie Jackson Jr. (D-IL)
Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX)
Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX)
Stephanie Tubbs Jones (D-OH)
Marcy Kaptur (D-OH)
Patrick Kennedy (D-RI)
Dale Kildee (D-MI)
Carolyn Kilpatrick (D-MI)
Dennis Kucinich (D-OH)
Barbara Lee (D-CA)
John Lewis (D-GA)
Zoe Lofgren (D-CA)
Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)
Ed Markey (D-MA)
Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY)
Jim McDermott (D-WA)
James McGovern (D-MA)
Cynthia McKinney (D-GA)
Martin Meehan (D-MA)
Kendrick Meek (D-FL)
Gregory Meeks (D-NY)
Michael Michaud (D-ME)
George Miller (D-CA)
Gwen S. Moore (D-WI)
James Moran (D-VA)
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY)
Grace Napolitano (D-CA)
James Oberstar (D-MN)
John Olver (D-MA)
Major Owens (D-NY)
Frank Pallone (D-NJ)
Donald Payne (D-NJ)
Charles Rangel (D-NY)
Bobby Rush (D-IL)
Linda Sanchez (D-CA)
Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
Jan Schakowsky (D-IL)
Jose Serrano (D-NY)
Ike Skelton (D-MO)
Louise Slaughter (D-NY)
Hilda Solis (D-CA)
Pete Stark (D-CA)
Ellen Tauscher (D-CA)
Bennie Thompson (D-MS)
Edolphus Towns (D-NY)
Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)
Nydia Velazquez (D-NY)
Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL)
Maxine Waters (D-CA)
Diane Watson (D-CA)
Melvin Watt (D-NC)
Robert Wexler (D-FL)
Lynn Woolsey (D-CA)
David Wu (D-OR)
Albert R. Wynn (D-MD)
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