They seek him here, they seek him there....

So it seems, according to AP for today,

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is in good health and is running his terror organization, according to an Internet posting Friday purportedly from the group's spokesman - the latest claim about the fate of Iraq's most-wanted militant.

There was no way to verify the statement's authenticity, but it follows several recent postings - including one from the same spokesman - that al-Zarqawi was wounded. Conflicting reports on whether he had died or been taken abroad for treatment led to speculation about confusion or jockeying for position among underlings.

In recent days, then, he has been described as wounded (maybe shot in the lung), dead, the target of an internal power play, and just fine, thank you very much for asking.

During the interregnum demarcated by "he's shot" and "he's fine," there was a fair amount of speculation on what the effect on the insurgency of Zarqawi's incapacitation or death would be. Despite all the talking (and writing) heads, the answer was clear all along: precisely the same as the capture of Saddam Hussein had. That is, none at all.

It's amazing how after all this time the US military, the White House, and their press corps lackeys insist on seeing the insurgency as a hierarchical organization rather than a mass of pissed-off people with overlapping but not identical convictions and goals. That extreme tunnel vision leads them to truly nonsensical arguments, such as those found in the already-notorious article in the May 15 New York Times magazine:

American forces in Iraq have often been accused of being slow to apply hard lessons from Vietnam and elsewhere about how to fight an insurgency. Yet, it seems from the outside, no one has shrugged off the lessons of history more decisively than the insurgents themselves.

The insurgents in Iraq are showing little interest in winning hearts and minds among the majority of Iraqis, in building international legitimacy, or in articulating a governing program or even a unified ideology or cause beyond expelling the Americans. They have put forward no single charismatic leader, developed no alternative government or political wing, displayed no intention of amassing territory to govern now.

Oh my, this is all so confusing, all so distressing! We just can't understand what they're up to! They have no charismatic leader! No political wing! No unified ideology beyond expelling the Americans! No...

Uh, hello?

Now, of course, there have been those of us who have argued from the very beginning that "expelling the Americans" is exactly the one thing that unites the insurgency. In fact, it serves as a good example of what's known as "leaderless resistance," a resistance movement characterized by small, independent cells driven by a common, even if vague, goal with little direct communication. The term was popularized by white supremacist Louis Beam in a series of essays in the 1980s and '90s. However, the concept, if not the term, appears considerably earlier in some discussions of nonviolent national defense. Its disadvantage is that it inhibits coordinated actions; its advantage is that, as the US has discovered to its frustration, it's difficult to undermine and all but impossible to penetrate because there is no organization that could be undermined or penetrated.

(Computer security researcher Simson L. Garfinkel has a decent discussion of leaderless resistance here; another writer, who takes some issue - as do I - with Garfinkel's seeming equation of leaderless resistance with both secrecy and evil ends chimes in here.)

But (and I use the word advisedly) our government, apparently suffering from a political version of Usher Syndrome, remains deaf even to its own words, blind even to its own insights. Yes, surely some elements of the resistance are concerned with more than solely "US out" and are looking to ultimately returning to a position of dominance. Yes, surely some of the murders of Shiites (and Christians, who have also been targeted) are driven not just by the notion of them as collaborators but by sectarian considerations. Yes, surely there are even those whose purpose is to provoke a sectarian war, even being eager to do heavenly battle with the infidels and apostates.

But yes, just as surely there are many - many - among the insurgents whose goal, whose "unified ideology" is indeed "expelling the Americans" and who might - I say might - even be convinced to engage in a classically political rather than an armed struggle if they could be confident that, win or lose as they as individuals might, in the end it would still be Iraqis, not Americans, in charge. And in the meantime, for who the very presence of foreign troops acts as a daily recruitment poster for other, more brutal, more selfish and fanatically sectarian, elements of that struggle.

The very nature of the insurgency strengthens, gives real weight to, the assertion I have made over and over again: Pulling out will not end the violence - but the violence will not end until we pull out. Set the Damn Date and Get The Hell Out!

Footnote One: In a further illustration, if one is thought necessary, of the obsequiousness of our mass media, in the stories about Zarqawi, reports of his condition were dutifully (and properly) reported as rumors that "could not be verified" - except, that is, when the Iraqi government reported on them, in which case the words "confirmed" and "confirmation" made regular appearances.

Footnote Two: The Sunday Times (UK) is reporting that according to a "senior commander of the Iraqi insurgency," Zarqawi was injured by shrapnel in a US missile attack three weeks ago and has fled the country. I have my doubts about the report because, to be blunt, I don't think there is such a thing as a senior commander of the Iraqi insurgency. At the same time, I admit to the possibility that the Times may have a source that labels himself (I'm prepared to assume it's a him) as such.